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This paper uses data from the European Community Household Panel, 1994-99, to 
investigate the arrival rate of job offers, the determinants of reservation wages, transitions 
out of unemployment, and accepted wages. In this exploratory treatment, we report that the 
arrival rate of job offers declines precipitously with jobless duration and age; that reservation 
wages do decline with the jobless spell (and aggregate unemployment); that transitions out of 
unemployment exhibit strong negative duration dependence for reasons that have more to 
do with the arrival rate of job offers than with reservation wages; and that the decline in 
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High and downwardly rigid reservation wages, most likely occasioned by generous 
unemployment benefits, are often held to be responsible for Europe’s high and persistent 
unemployment since the early 1970s. But this proposition has to be qualified in at least two 
important respects. First of all, direct evidence on the course of reservation wages is scant.
1 
Second of all, some European countries, most notably Eire, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and Denmark have made quite impressive gains in recent years and can no longer 
be included in the set of chronically-high unemployment rate countries. 
Given the informational deficiencies of most datasets – in particular, the lack of 
information on reservation wages and the arrival rate of job offers – the critical job search 
relationship between reservation wages, the arrival rate of job offers and unemployment 
duration cannot be obtained directly. Rather, it has to be inferred either from reduced-form 
approaches or from severely stylized structural models.  
In this paper, we explore the institutional diversity of labor markets in thirteen 
European countries with a view to understanding the variation in their unemployment 
experience over the sample period 1994-99. For this purpose, we rely on the longitudinal 
data from European Household Panel. This dataset is unique in providing uniform 
information on reservation wages, the arrival rate of job offers, elapsed unemployment 
duration, transitions from unemployment to employment, and reemployment wages. 
Our approach is in large part exploratory, seeking only at this stage to uncover some 
stylized facts on the behavior of reservation wages and related variables. Although 
descriptive, there are five important issues that we can address in this type of framework:  
(i) we will illuminate the notion that in Europe the arrival rate of job offers is very low and 
that acceptance rates are very high (higher than 90 percent), meaning that reservation wages 
necessarily play a muted (or no) role; 
(ii) we can investigate the main source of negative (unemployment) duration dependence, 
found in all countries of the sample. Given that the probability of locating an acceptable job 
depends on the arrival rate of job offers, the wage offer distribution, and the reservation   4
wage, we will seek to determine which component dominates in producing declining 
unemployment-to-employment hazard functions. This evaluation provides the basis for a 
better understanding of the mechanisms producing employer stigmatization, human capital 
depreciation over the course of joblessness, the loss of informational networks that sustain 
job contacts, discouragement, and even a simple sorting of the more employable into 
employment; 
(iii) we will look in detail into the question of whether reservation wages are constant or 
instead declining through time. The constant reservation wage hypothesis provides a useful, 
parsimonious way of recouping the structural parameters of the job search model. However, 
in the few instances where this hypothesis is tested it has been soundly rejected (see, for 
example, Kiefer and Neumann, 1979). In our case, the simple correlations between (log) 
unemployment duration and reservation wages evince a negative association in all thirteen 
countries (statistically insignificant in four of them), suggesting that factors such as depletion 
of household income, finite lives, changes in the wage offer distribution, and/or a declining 
arrival rate of job offers may play a role;  
(iv) having characterized the determinants of the reservation wages, we consider the impact 
of reservation wages on duration under a non-stationary regime. In this exercise, we shall 
exploit the information on transitions into employment while taking into account length-bias 
sampling; and, 
(v) we will also take advantage of the available information about the wages earned by 
reemployed workers to further investigate the indication of declining reservation wages,   
which phenomenon, if sustained, should have a counterpart in a negative association 
between wages and the duration of unemployment. Here, the issues of self selection into 
employment and the endogeneity of jobless duration have also to be addressed. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the unique dataset. Section 
III analyzes the determinants of the arrival rates of job offers, section IV the reservation 
wage, section V unemployment transitions, and section VI reemployment wages. A brief 
summary concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Studies by Lancaster (1983, 1985) and Jones (1988, 1989) for the United Kingdom, Gorter and Gorter  (1993) 
for the Netherlands, and Prasad (2002) for Germany are notable exceptions of single-country studies that use 
survey information on reservation wages.   5
II. Data description 
 
We use information from six waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), 
1994-99. The actual data cover the interval January 1993 through December 1998. The 
ECHP survey interviews individuals once a year, and asks them a range of questions relating 
to their labor market experience during the preceding calendar year. We use data from 13 out 
of the 15 EU countries, namely, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Finland. The excluded 
countries are Luxembourg and Sweden where is not possible to follow individuals through 
time. With the exception of three countries, the data cover the entire period. The exceptions 
are Germany, where we include data from just the 1994-96 waves (because of missing data 
on hourly reservation wages in subsequent years), together with Austria and Finland which  
were only added to the panel in 1995 and 1996, respectively. 
In the ECHP every individual actively looking for a job is asked two questions 
pertaining first to desired hours of work and second to the minimum income required to 
work these hours. The actual survey questions that are used to measure the reservation wage 
are: “Assuming you could find suitable work, how many hours per week would you prefer to work in this 
new job?” and “What is the minimum net monthly income would you accept to work [number of hours in 
previous question] hours a week in this new job?” The crucial reservation wage construct in this 
paper is, then, an hourly net reservation wage, measured as the ratio of the net monthly 
income to the optimal number of hours. This measure and all other monetary variables in 
the different countries were transformed in a single currency unit using the Purchasing 
Power Parities (PPP) published by Eurostat. 
The other key variable in our study is the duration of the unemployment spell. We 
use as a measure of search duration the length of each spell of joblessness. The ECHP 
sampling procedure considers only jobless  spells for individuals with previous work 
experience, for whom we are able to identify the month and year of job loss. Given that we 
know the month and year of the interview (the exception to this rule being Germany), we 
compute elapsed unemployment duration as the period between the point of job loss up 
until the interview month. (For Germany, we assume that all the interviews were carried out 
in October.)   6
It is no less important for the purposes of this empirical inquiry to have a measure of 
job offer rates. To this end, we exploit the question in the survey asking each unemployed 
individual whether or not he/she received a job offer in the previous month. The actual 
question is: “Have you received any job offer during the past 4 weeks?” To this reported number of 
offers, for some specifications, we shall add those individuals who were employed at the 
survey date but unemployed one month earlier and who therefore obtained a job during the 
month preceding the interview. 
As was noted earlier, the assessment made by workers of the wage distribution (of 
available jobs) plays a very important role in search theory as it against this distribution that 
workers set their reservation wages. Accordingly, reservation wages should be a function of 
the same set of variables as determine not only accepted wages but also, and more generally, 
wages available in the economy. In order to compute the expected wage of each unemployed 
worker we estimate a conventional earnings function for each country, so as form an 
expected wage for the unemployed individuals.
2 
Before presenting summary statistics of the main variables used in this study, we 
need to address the quality of our data and their adequacy for an analysis of reservation 
wages. First, although past studies suffer from a potential problem of low responses rates to 
the reservation wage question, this is not a consideration here. With the exception of the 
Netherlands, the response rate is quite large, ranging from 92 percent in Finland to almost 
100 percent in Greece (see Appendix Table 1). Second, job search theory requires that 
reservation wages exceed unemployment benefits and this requirement is also generally met 
in the dataset. In only 10 percent of the cases (215 out of 2,063 observations) do reservation 
wages fall below reported monthly unemployment benefit levels.
3 Third, another search-
theoretic condition is that accepted wages exceed reservation wages. Here, it is somewhat 
disturbing that our data show a relatively larger fraction of workers accepting jobs paying 
below the stated reservation wages. That said, this observation makes no allowance for self-
selection into reemployment or for any erosion of the reservation wages that might have 
occurred.   
                                                 
2 Log wages were regressed on categorical variables for education and age, gender, marital status, dependent 
children, and a set of year dummies. 
3 We only have data on monthly unemployment benefits for eight countries - Denmark, the Netherlands, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Austria - so that in practice we used annual rather than monthly benefit   7
There is some asymmetry in the distribution of workers across countries, as can be 
seen from the material given in Appendix Table 2. In particular, there is some over-
representation of individuals from southern European countries (Italy, Spain, and Portugal), 
with France and Germany contributing a smaller number of workers. This reflects the 
incidence of unemployment experiences among countries in the sample (e.g. the high 
unemployment rate of Spain) and the shorter sample period of others (e.g.  Germany). 
(Table 1 near here) 
Summary statistics for the main variables used in this study are presented in Table 1 
for the sample of unemployed workers. The pattern is familiar for Europe but note that 
while reported unemployment duration is long, what is actually being measured here is 
joblessness rather than unemployment. To this extent, unemployment per se is overstated.   
Also observe the relatively low level of schooling in the sample (just only 13 percent have a 
college degree, 16 percent for women) and the relatively  low mean age (over 50 percent of 
the workers are aged less than 35 years).   
 
III. The arrival rate of job offers  
 
We model the determinants of the arrival rate of job offers using an extreme value 
probability model as follows  
  () [] β β π ' exp exp 1 ) ' ( x x − − =  ,                           (1)   
where  ) ' ( β π x  gives the probability of receiving a job offer,  x denotes the vector of 
explanatory variables, and β identifies the corresponding regression coefficients. The choice 
of an extreme-minimal-value distribution was guided by its ability to mix naturally with the 
grouped version of the proportional hazards model (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978).
4 
                                                                                                                                                 
data. However, the use of monthly data for these eight countries resulted in very similar findings to those 
reported here for annual data.  
4 The complementary log-log model is nonsymmetric. It is close to the logistic function for low values of π  
but with a considerably less heavy right tail (Fahrmeir and Tutz, 1994). As with other binary choice models, the 
interpretation of the regression coefficient is not straightforward. In this case it will be helpful to compute the 
implied marginal effects for the covariate xj , given by 
) ' ( ) ' exp( )) ' exp( exp( ) ' exp(
) ' (
β π β β β β β
β π








.    8
Our main focus here will be upon the impact of unemployment duration and 
unemployment insurance recipiency on the likelihood of a worker getting a job offer in any 
four-week period. A further important consideration is the influence of age on the offer rate. 
Table 2 provides the regression coefficient estimates for the probability that an unemployed 
worker will receive a job offer. In the first two columns, the sample comprises only those 
individuals unemployed at the time of the survey that report having received an offer in the 
previous four weeks. In the last two columns, we add in those workers who got a new job in 
the last four weeks and who were previously unemployed on the assumption they also 
received the offer in the self-same period.
5 
(Table 2 near here) 
Perhaps the most interesting result from the table is the negative impact of elapsed 
unemployment duration on the job offer’s arrival probability. It can be seen that the arrival 
rate of job offers declines very strongly with jobless duration. The marginal effect of 
unemployment duration on the adjusted arrival rate of job offers – evaluated at the mean 
sample values of the variables included in the regression and shown in second and fourth 
columns of the table – is quite large. This holds in particular for our preferred adjusted 
arrival rate of job offers (-0.131). 
Other notable results from Table 2 are the effects of personal characteristics (age, 
gender, education) on one hand and unemployment benefits and the rate of unemployment 
on the other. Male and younger workers clearly have a much higher probability of receiving a 
job offer. Age has a particularly strong negative impact on the probability of receiving a job 
offer. This effect would generally add to the impact of unemployment duration, noted 
earlier, since older workers typically experience longer unemployment spells. Also, workers 
with more education are more likely to receive job offers. Note, however, that the results for 
the household size variable intended to proxy a network effect (larger households being 
associated with more extensive networks) are perverse albeit weak.  
The amount of unemployment benefits received does not have any clear impact on 
the probability of receiving a job offer. When we restrict the sample to unemployed workers 
(in the first column), the coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant, but if we adjust 
the rate of job offers by including those workers who are already working at the time of the 
                                                 
5 Germany is excluded from the regression in column three because we do not observe the month of the 
interview and cannot therefore compute each worker’s job tenure with the required precision.   9
survey (in the third column) the impact is negative, and receipt of benefits is clearly 
associated with a lower arrival rate of job offers. The same conflicting results are obtained 
for the unemployment rate. That is to say, the results in the first column point to pro-
cyclicality in the arrival rate of job offers: a higher unemployment rate decreases the 
probability of receiving an offer. By contrast, in the third column the coefficient estimate is 
not statistically significant and is positively signed.  Arguably, adding into the ‘sample’ those 
individuals who not only received a job offer but also accepted it renders that sample less 
sensitive to the cycle. 
 
IV. Determinants of the reservation wage 
 
We now turn to an examination of the determinants of the reservation wage. 
Describing the behavior of the reservation wage is of fundamental importance in 
understanding its role in the worker’s unemployment experience. Special attention will be 
accorded the issue of the stationarity of the reservation wage over time, and its relationship 
with expected wages and aggregate economic conditions as indexed by the overall 
unemployment rate. 
The reservation wage equation may be expressed as 
ε λ β + + = t x wR log ' log  ,                               (2) 
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, t denotes elapsed unemployment duration, and 
ε is an error term.  
(Table 3 near here) 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the hourly reservation wage equation. In 
order to control for non-stationarity in the offered wage distribution, we include the 
estimated wage computed for each unemployed individual obtained from hourly wage 
regressions run for each country.  As before, the excluded category for age is the group aged 
above 55 years. Unemployment benefit is measured by the annual benefit amount received 
during the year prior to the survey. 
 The first column of the table does not include elapsed unemployment duration as an 
explanatory variable.  In this specification, we see that reservation wages are larger for older 
workers, while males have reservation wages that are roughly 5 percent higher than for 
females. All other variables also have the expected sign. Thus, for example, those with   10
dependent children have higher reservation wages (more than 2 percent higher than their 
counterparts without such dependents), as do workers who own their homes (although the 1 
percent elevation in the reservation wage seems too small to have much traction in 
subsequently raising unemployment). But most interesting of all are the results for the 
unemployment benefits and the unemployment rate. In particular, we obtain a very small 
elasticity of reservation wages with respect to annual unemployment benefits. In both this 
specification and those in the next two columns of the table, this elasticity is always smaller 
than 1 percent. Also observe the strongly pro-cyclical impact of macroeconomic conditions 
on reservation wages. This result is also robust to specification. The finding that more 
adverse labor market conditions are associated with a lower reservation wage is an important 
and novel result of this inquiry and it provides another indication of the non-stationarity of 
its distribution, especially given that we are also controlling for country and year effects.  
The country dummies capture differences at the country level in reservation wages. 
The low relative values reported for the United Kingdom are quite striking. Unemployed 
British workers have the lowest reservation wages of all. The Portuguese unemployed come 
next, while their Iberian neighbors evince the highest reservation wages. 
The specification in the second column of Table 3 includes elapsed unemployment 
duration as a regressor. The variable has the expected negative sign and is statistically 
different from zero, with a small elasticity of -1.4 percent. However, one might expect this 
estimate to be biased due to the simultaneity between duration and the reservation wage. In 
an attempt to cope with this particular problem, we instrumented unemployment duration 
(the instruments used to identify the reservation wage equation are the number of dependent 
children, family size, and dummies for marital status, an outstanding mortgage and schooling 
level).
 6 The results are presented in the final column of the table and duly show a much 
larger effect, with the estimated unemployment duration elasticity rising to -10 percent. 
In each case the findings given in Table 3 are pooled cross-section samples. In 
results not reported (but available on request) we also estimated an individual fixed-effects 
model that included either multiple spells of unemployment or multiple observations of the 
                                                 
6 The full set of variables for the log unemployment duration equation are: the expected wage, the number of 
dependent children, the unemployment rate, household size, and the log unemployment benefit, and  dummies 
for home ownership, outstanding mortgage, gender, marital status, age group, schooling, year and country of 
residence.   11
same spell of unemployment. The results pointed in the same direction, but are generally less 
strong, with much smaller estimated elasticities.  
 
V. Transitions out of unemployment  
 
In this section, we investigate the duration of unemployment with a view to understanding 
how reservation wages influence the transitions process. Unemployment duration 
dependence will also be addressed.  
  We consider empirical results for transitions from unemployment into employment. 
The estimation strategy is to specify the grouped version of the proportional hazards model 
(after Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978) and condition the hazard function on elapsed duration. 
We shall define the discrete hazard function as 
[] {} β ' ) ( exp exp 1 ) | ( x s g x t h + − − = ,                    (3) 
where s is elapsed duration, and g(s) is a fourth-degree polynomial function which reflects the 






2 1 0 ) ( s s s s s g α α α α α + + + + =    0 0 ≥ α   . 
The estimation results are based on a hazard model, where the hazard rate gives the 
probability of exiting unemployment over the course of the next twelve months (being the 
periodicity of the survey), conditional on staying unemployed until a given observed elapsed 
duration. In other words, one can think of the transition rate as an annual measure. 
(Figure 1 near here) 
It is worth mentioning at the outset that the baseline hazard function exhibits strong 
negative duration dependence over the first 36 months of unemployment. Figure 1 gives the 
baseline hazard function for an individual possessing sample average characteristics for the 
non-dichotomous covariates, and with reference values for the binary variables (i. e. being 
female, single, having basic schooling, aged between 26 and 35 years and without a 
mortgage), and residing in Spain (the country with the largest number of unemployed).   
Negative duration dependence can arise from a number of competing causes. Within 
the framework of the job search model it can be produced by declining job offer arrival 
rates, increasing reservation wages, or from an adversely shifting wage offer distribution (or,   12
indeed, any combination of these factors). Given our previous findings on reservation wages, 
it seems reasonable to anticipate that this component will not play a material role.  
The seeming importance of the time pattern of the arrival rate of job offers (see 
Table 2) elevates explanations for negative duration dependence based on a pure sorting of 
the more employable of the unemployed. Here stigmatization by employers is based on the 
signal provided by elapsed unemployment duration and, to a lesser extent, by the 
depreciation of human capital stocks over the course of the spell of unemployment (which 
can also be reflected in a leftward shifting wage offer distribution).   
(Table 4 near here) 
At the theoretical level, the relationship between reservation wages and 
unemployment duration/transition probabilities is unambiguous: higher reservation wages 
should lead to reduced transition rates and longer unemployment spells, ceteris paribus. This is 
indeed the indication from the first two columns of Table 4. But the estimated reservation 
wage elasticity is fairly small, especially once we do not allow the reservation wage to pick up 
the influence of diverse labor market institutions across countries (column 2 versus 1).   
Thus, a 10 percent increase in the reservation wage is estimated to depress the hazard rate by 
1.4 percent in the first case, and by only 0.6 percent in the second case.  
The other regression coefficient estimates shown in Table 4 are fairly conventional. 
Accordingly, males have a better prospect of finding a job than females, being married 
improves the odds of moving into employment, and being older that 55 severely limits the 
chances of getting a job. But for its part education does not seem to be accelerate the 
transition into employment nor does household size appear to influence the probability of 
finding an acceptable job. Increases in the aggregate unemployment rate – once we control 
for country effects – do diminish hazard rates.   
It is interesting to note that Germany exhibits the lowest (conditional) transition 
rates and Spain the highest.
7 This indication is not at odds with the international evidence on 
comparative unemployment rates. Nevertheless, recall that this result is conditional on 
                                                 
7 The seemingly favorable result for Spain is explained in large part by the high turnover rates of individuals 
employed under fixed-term contracts. Such contracts account for 35 percent of the stock of dependent 
employment (Bover et al., 2000).    13
unemployment rates and, further, that the unemployment rate is determined by both the 
flow into unemployment (not studied here) and the duration of unemployment.  
In a non-stationary environment with declining reservation wages, the estimation of 
the hazard regression model is no longer clear-cut. If reservation wages decrease over the 
spell of unemployment, as hinted at above, there are clear endogeneity issues stemming from 
the simultaneous determination of reservation wages and unemployment duration (and 
transition rates). In an attempt to address this problem, the reservation wage variable was 
instrumented, using the amount of unemployment benefits, the number of children, and the 
number of dependent children as identifying instruments. The results of this exercise are 
presented in the last two columns of Table 4. As before, if one allows the reservation wage 
variable to pick up differences across countries, a large and statistically significant reservation 
wage elasticity is reported: a 10 percent increase in the reservation wage implies a decline of 
3.8 percent in the escape rate. Once one includes country effects, however, the estimated 
impact of the reservation wage turns positive, although on this occasion the coefficient 
estimate is not statistically significant.
8 
 
VI. Accepted wages   
 
Estimation of the accepted wage regression function raises two main econometric problems. 
The first problem is the endogeneity created by the potentially simultaneous determination 
of the accepted wage and the duration of unemployment. The second problem derives from 
the fact that we only observe the wages of the unemployed who are able to find a job, raising 
a sample selection problem. 
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                                                                                   (4)    
where  logwadenotes the logarithm of the accepted hourly wage, logt stands for the 
logarithm of the elapsed unemployment duration, and emp is a binary variable indicating 
                                                 
8 It appears that the exclusion of country effects helps to identify the impact of reservation wages, but the basis 
for including country effects in the reservation wage equation and excluding them in the transition equation is 
open to discussion.   14
employment status. The first function is the structural equation, the second is the linear 
projection for the endogenous variable, and the third is the selection equation. Whereas 
elapsed duration is always observed, accepted wages are only observed if emp is equal to 1. 
Assuming that u N e ~ ( , ) 01  and orthogonality between the error terms and the 
variables included in z, the estimation procedure is: 
(i) estimate the probit using all observations; 












, where φ(.) denotes the standard 
normal density function, and Φ(.) its cumulative function; 
(iii) estimate by 2SLS  log log $ wz t ia ia a a i a ie ia =+ + + γα η λε  , using (zii e , $ λ ) as instruments. 
The hypotheses of endogeneity and of self-selection can then be tested on the basis 
of the α a and ηa, using the conventional 2SLS t-ratio. 
(Table 5 near here) 
Regression results for the determinants of post-unemployment wages are provided in 
Table 5.  We specify a (log) jobless-duration-augmented Mincerian wage regression, along 
the lines of Addison and Portugal (1989). This relationship between post-unemployment 
(strictly displacement) wages and unemployment duration has been used as an indirect test 
of the declining reservation wage hypothesis.
9 The impact of unemployment duration on 
wages can of course also be interpreted as an indicator (proxy) of poor productivity, or as a 
measure of the depreciation of human capital during joblessness, or (to some degree) the 
wage effect of stigmatisation. 
   The coefficient estimate for unemployment duration provided in the first column of 
the Table 5 indicates that the jobless spell exerts a statistically significant depressing effect on 
accepted wages. The sign and size of the coefficient are in line with the effects estimated for 
the reservation wage, thereby vindicating the declining reservation wage hypothesis. That 
said, the influence of unemployment duration on accepted wages is not large: a 10 percent 
increase in unemployment duration leads to a wage decrease of 0.38 percent. The education 
coefficients estimates are significant, although muted, and the two demographic variables 
                                                 
9 The basic idea is that if reservation wages decline with duration of unemployment, so too should expected 
wages.     15
(being male and married) register their familiar positive effects. Surprisingly, the age-earnings 
profile is remarkably flat. As for the estimated country effects, it can be seen that Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and Ireland have the highest accepted wages, whereas those in Portugal and 
Greece are the lowest. 
A problem with the specification in the first column of the table is that it is based 
solely on those workers who were able to find a job, ignoring some two-thirds of the initial 
sample that remained unemployed. In the context of the job search approach it is palpably 
unconvincing to argue that the sub-sample of reemployed workers is a random sample of the 
population of unemployed individuals. Self-selection is clearly an issue here. As a first-pass 
check, a standard Heckman self-selection model was estimated. The second column of the 
table presents the sample-selection corrected estimates of the accepted wage equation. There 
are three issues. First, the correction for sample selection does not materially alter the effect 
of unemployment duration on wages. Second, the age-earnings profile becomes much 
steeper than before. And third, there is every indication that self-selection is negative; that is, 
reemployed workers (presumably because their reservation wage are low) receive wages 
lower than (the expected wage of) those who continue searching, presumably because their 
reservation wages are lower. 
Because accepted wages and unemployment duration may be simultaneously 
determined, a self-selection model with endogenous explanatory variables was also 
estimated, employing the procedure described above. The results for the accepted wage 
equation are presented in the third column of the table. The bottom line is that, despite our 
now treating unemployment duration as an endogenous variable in the accepted wage 




The major findings of this paper have been as follows. First, with respect to the arrival rate 
of job offers, we show that it declines sharply with the duration of unemployment and with 
age. Second, with respect to the reservation wage, we report that there is convincing 
evidence that reservation wages are not stationary. However, the fall in reservation wages 
through the spell of unemployment is not very pronounced. But reservation wages appear to   16
be very responsive to changes in the unemployment rates. Third, concerning the duration of 
unemployment, we argue that the hazard function exhibits strong negative duration 
dependence, most likely due to the behavior of the arrival rate of job offers through time. 
The impact of reservation wages on the probability of finding a suitable job is, however, 
muted at best. Our results contain a clear suggestion that the relationship between accepted 
wages and duration of unemployment shadows the relationship between reservation wages 
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eTable 1: Sample Means and Standard Deviations
Variable All Male Female
Log hourly reservation wage 3,007 3,047 2,962
(0,422) (0,432) (0,407)
Unemployment duration (months) 21,285 20,960 21,644
(23,542) (23,296) (23,807)
Unemployment benefits (in logs) 7,989 8,082 7,886
(0,967) (0,952) (0,972)
Unemployment rate 12,072 12,474 11,627
(4,462) (4,443) (4,441)




High school graduate 0,319 0,288 0,352
(0,466) (0,453) (0,478)
College graduate 0,129 0,101 0,161
(0,366) (0,301) (0,367)
Age 18-25 0,244 0,237 0,252
(0,429) (0,425) (0,434)
Age 26-35 0,313 0,288 0,341
(0,464) (0,453) (0,474)
Age 36-45 0,216 0,208 0,225
(0,411) (0,406) (0,417)
Age 46-55 0,160 0,176 0,142
(0,366) (0,381) (0,349)
Household size 3,595 3,696 3,484
(1.602) (1.694) (1.484)
Number of children 0,745 0,719 0,775
(1,042) (1,092) (0,983)
Dependent children 0,438 0,403 0,477
(0,496) (0,491) (0,500)
Married 0,473 0,449 0,498
(0,499) (0,497) (0,500)
Home ownership 0,619 0,617 0,620
(0.486) (0.486) (0.485)
Unemploymento to employment transition rate 0,362 0,383 0,339
(0,481) (0,486) (0,473)
Log household income 9,610 9,551 9,675
(0,750) (0,790) (0,697)
Unemployment benefits recipiency 0,425 0,427 0,423
(0,494) (0,495) (0,494)
Job offer rate 0,091 0,088 0,095
(0,288) (0,284) (0,293)Table 2: The Determinants of the Arrival Rate of Job Offers (Extreme Value Regression Estimation)
Variables
Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect
Unemployment duration  -0,217 -0,023 -0,356 -0,131
(0.023) (0.012)
Unemployment benefits 0,004 0,000 -0,047 -0,019
(0.007) (0.004)
Unemployment rate -0,065 -0,007 0,002 0,001
(0.032) (0.014)
Individual income 0,043 0,005 0,050 0,021
(0.009) (0.005)
Male 0,103 0,011 0,241 0,099
(0.050) (0.025)
High school graduate 0,199 0,021 0,086 0,035
(0.056) (0.028)
College graduate 0,442 0,047 0,294 0,121
(0.070) (0.036)
Age 18-25 1,705 0,180 1,285 0,530
(0.169) (0.080)
Age 26-35 1,508 0,159 1,098 0,453
(0.164) (0.078)
Age 36-45 1,369 0,145 0,909 0,375
(0.166) (0.078)
Age 46-55 1,030 0,109 0,611 0,252
(0.169) (0.082)
Household size -0,044 -0,005 -0,023 -0,009
(0.022) (0.011)
Number of children 0,010 0,001 -0,012 -0,005
(0.047) (0.022)
Dependent children 0,041 0,004 0,048 0,020
(0.085) (0.042)




Denmark -3,066 -0,324 -1,148 -0,474
(0.304) (0.140)
The Netherlands -3,480 -0,368 -1,463 -0,604
(0.284) (0.132)
Belgium -2,991 -0,316 -1,584 -0,654
(0.352) (0.169)
France -3,187 -0,337 -1,135 -0,468
(0.396) (0.182)
United Kingdom -3,267 -0,345 -1,713 -0,707
(0.357) (0.167)
Ireland -3,251 -0,343 -1,436 -0,593
(0.450) (0.203)
Italy -3,242 -0,342 -1,795 -0,741
(0.389) (0.182)
Greece -3,851 -0,407 -2,619 -1,081
(0.344) (0.165)
Spain -2,532 -0,267 -1,740 -0,718
(0.591) (0.270)
Portugal -4,153 -0,439 -1,861 -0,768
(0.307) (0.140)
Austria -2,875 -0,304 -1,380 -0,570
(0.258) (0.129)
Finland -2,767 -0,292 -1,643 -0,678
(0.485) (0.224)
Log-likelihhod -5936,3 -14156,1
Number of observations 24242 28723
Asymptotic standard deviations in parentheses.
Notes: The marginal effect is computed as
The regression also includes four year dummies.
Dependent variable
Adjusted arrival rte of job offers  Arrival rate of job offers
)) ) exp( exp( β β β X X + −Table 3: The Determinants of the Reservation Wage (OLS and IV Estimation)
OLS OLS IV
Variables
Unemployment duration    -0,014 -0,100
 (0.002) (0.032)
Expected wage  0,405 0,402 0,374
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Unemployment rate -0,053 -0,053 -0,051
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployment benefits 0,000 0,001 0,006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Male 0,053 0,052 0,038
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Age 18-25 -0,084 -0,095 -0,185
(0.012) (0.013) (0.035)
Age 26-35 -0,085 -0,091 -0,147
(0.011) (0.011) (0.023)
Age 36-45 -0,073 -0,077 -0,119
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019)
Age 46-55 -0,064 -0,066 -0,093
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Home ownership 0,028 0,026 0,016
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Dependent children 0,022 0,022 0,029
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Germany 2,287 2,333 2,684
(0.056) (0.057) (0.139)
Denmark 2,392 2,432 2,724
(0.057) (0.057) (0.120)
The Netherlands 2,228 2,278 2,649
(0.058) (0.058) (0.146)
Belgium 2,475 2,521 2,869
(0.060) (0.060) (0.139)
France 2,388 2,433 2,762
(0.062) (0.062) (0.134)
United Kingdom 1,791 1,836 2,177
(0.059) (0.059) (0.137)
Ireland 2,543 2,584 2,893
(0.066) (0.067) (0.130)
Italy 2,466 2,511 2,851
(0.060) (0.060) (0.137)
Greece 2,232 2,274 2,582
(0.052) (0.053) (0.123)
Spain 2,685 2,722 3,023
(0.075) (0.075) (0.131)
Portugal 1,881 1,923 2,228
(0.045) (0.046) (0.120)
Austria 1,932 1,974 2,291
(0.053) (0.053) (0.126)
Finland 2,473 2,507 2,795
(0.066) (0.066) (0.122)
Log-likelihood -6686,2 -6668,7 -6681,3
Number of observations 18482 18482 18482
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: The regression also includes four year dummies.
SpecificationTable 4: Transitions from Unemployment to Employment (Polynomial Hazard Function) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
Reservation wage  -0,138 -0,056    
(0.030) (0.034)   
Predicted reservation wage      -0,376 0,145
   (0.060) (0.371)
Unemployment rate 0,019 -0,031 0,018 -0,020
(0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.025)
Male 0,157 0,183 0,182 0,159
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.049)
High school graduate -0,097 -0,039 -0,067 -0,055
(0.028) (0.029) (0.023) (0.41)
College graduate 0,007 0,034 0,058 -0,006
(0.38) (0.039) (0.039) (0.080)
Age 18-25 0,548 0,556 0,504 0,594
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.098)
Age 26-35 0,695 0,697 0,680 0,714
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.074)
Age 36-45 0,715 0,717 0,716 0,721
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
Age 46-55 0,602 0,619 0,607 0,618
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070)
Household size 0,003 -0,004 0,003 -0,004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Married 0,113 0,098 0,118 0,088
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.034)
Mortage 0,033 0,074 0,041 0,071
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Constant -2,340 -1,168
(0.138) (0.208)
Germany  -2,902  -3,605
 (0.204)  (1.306)
Denmark  -2,335  -3,062
 (0.195)  (1.355)
The  Netherlands  -2,493  -3,199
 (0.196)  (1.313)
Belgium  -2,401  -3,148
 (0.217)  (1.393)
France  -2,304  -3,031
 (0.230)  (1.359)
United  Kingdom  -2,828  -3,435
 (0.206)  (1.135)
Ireland  -2,336  -3,098
 (0.257)  (1.427)
Italy  -2,178  -2,918
 (0.227)  (1.381)
Greece  -2,221  -2,881
 (0.200)  (1.230)
Spain  -1,738  -2,509
 (0.317)  (1.459)
Portugal  -2,012  -2,591
 (0.172)  (1.076)
Austria  -2,261  -2,887
 (0.173)  (1.163)
Finland  -1,901  -2,621
 (0.265)  (1.357)
Log-likelihood -10968 -10832,4 -10958,9 -10833,6
Number of observations 18482 18482 18482 18482
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: The regression also includes four year dummies.
SpecificationTable 5: The Determinants of the Post-Unemployment Wages
OLS Heckman Endogeneity
Variables correction with self-selection
Unemployment duration  -0,038 -0,036 -0,092
(0.004) (0.004) (0.025)
High school graduate 0,088 0,076 0,078
(0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
College graduate 0,299 0,261 0,270
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
Male 0,119 0,078 0,092
(0.009) (0.014) (0.016)
Age 18-25 -0,091 -0,268 -0,237
(0.027) (0.059) (0.064)
Age 26-35 0,019 -0,142 -0,091
(0.026) (0.054) (0.062)
Age 36-45 0,057 -0,091 -0,035
(0.027) (0.051 (0.059)
Age 46-55 0,041 -0,072 -0,027
(0.028) (0.043) (0.050)
Married 0,059 0,040 0,047
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Germany 2,972 3,4 3,343
(0.040) (0.132) (0.138)
Denmark 3,275 3,641 3,590
(0.032) (0.112) (0.118)
The Netherlands 3,269 3,687 3,663
(0.033) (0.127) (0.132)
Belgium 3,155 3,607 3,557
(0.037) (0.138) (0.145)
France 3,038 3,462 3,410
(0.033) 0,129 (0.136)
United Kingdom 3,077 3,531 3,458
(0.040) 0,139 (0.149)
Ireland 3,214 3,609 3,559
(0.032) (0.120) (0.127)
Italy 3,091 3,508 3,452
(0.032) (0.127) (0.133)
Greece 2,687 3,121 3,033
(0.034) (0.132) (0.142)
Spain 2,924 3,330 3,270
(0.030) (0.123) (0.131)
Portugal 2,486 2,866 2,815
(0.032) (0.116) (0.122)
Austria 3,1 3,491 3,435
(0.037) (0.121) (0.127)





2  0,364 0,365 0,358
Number of observations 8852 8852 8852
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: The regression also includes four year dummies.
SpecificationAppendix Table 1: Reservation Wage Response Rates
 
Country Looking for a job Reporting Reservation Wage Ratio
Germany 930 903 0,971
Denmark 1249 1211 0,970
The Netherlands 1437 832 0,579
Belgium 1247 1167 0,936
France 4105 4026 0,981
United Kingdom 1051 978 0,931
Ireland 1894 1833 0,968
Italy 7004 6954 0,993
Greece 3573 3556 0,995
Spain 7424 7315 0,985
Portugal 2183 2128 0,975
Austria 560 552 0,986
Finland 1885 1728 0,917
Total 34542 33183 0,961
Appendix Table 2: Distribution of Individuals by Country of Residence
Country Number of observations Share
Germany 8746 0,068
Denmark 4994 0,039
The Netherlands 9577 0,074
Belgium 6145 0,048
France 13051 0,101








Total 129064 1,000Appendix Table 3: Selected Summary Statistics
Countries Reservation wage/Expected wage Reservation wage/Accepted wage Accepted wage/Expected wage Offer rate  Adjusted offer rate Elapsed duration Transition rate
(months)
Germany 1,040 1,373 0,843 0,098 . 28,3 0,167
Denmark 1,101 1,118 1,057 0,103 0,294 16,4 0,246
Netherlands 0,956 1,030 0,998 0,060 0,204 35,1 0,180
Belgium 1,089 1,351 0,976 0,083 0,123 33,3 0,194
France 0,929 1,224 0,947 0,067 0,238 24 0,217
UK 0,722 0,850 0,906 0,076 0,175 23 0,199
Ireland 1,006 1,038 1,073 0,058 0,273 21,2 0,237
Italy 1,099 1,264 1,001 0,064 0,184 19,8 0,309
Greece 1,220 1,354 0,973 0,045 0,073 15,2 0,423
Spain 1,014 1,192 0,989 0,082 0,187 18,2 0,379
Portugal 1,129 1,228 0,991 0,030 0,181 17,1 0,378
Austria 1,017 1,038 1,076 0,148 0,223 19,3 0,308
Finland 0,950 1,103 0,946 0,087 0,166 18,1 0,352
Overall 1,033 1,190 0,994 0,072 0,194 21,2 0,300WORKING PAPERS
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